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A B S T R A C T
Embedded in a systemic and chronic process, corruption in education is a pervasive element that
exacerbates developing countries’ efforts to educate their citizens. Understanding the cumulative impact
rests upon exposing key features of educational corruption and bringing to light the varied forms in
which corruption emerges within institutions of higher education. Classifying educational corruption
may be elusive in the developing settings due to the acceptability and prevalence of the phenomenon;
yet, it is imperative that more attention is focused on this area. Based on the empirical research
conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s higher education, this paper broadens current understanding of
typologies of educational corruption by incorporating the novel forms emerging in the post-war and
developing environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, the study surprisingly ﬁnds that elites
gravitate towards and beneﬁt from non-pecuniary corruption while the poor tend to bribe. The study
places the onus on the lack of accountability of elite powermaneuvers and aims to aid in creating further
awareness to combat corruption.
ã 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction1
As the growth of [111_TD$DIFF]educational corruption threatens to unravel
the increasing international support of education in recent years,
practitioners and academics alike have begun to look into the
types, causes, and consequences of corruption. This empirical
research, depicting new forms of corruption that have emerged in
the post-war higher education of Bosnia and Herzegovina, expands
current typologies of [111_TD$DIFF]educational corruption by utilizing Bosnia as
a source of primary data.We raise two primary research questions:
Is corruption present in Bosnia? If so, in which forms is it
exhibited?
The breakup of former Yugoslavia and consequent wars in the
Western Balkans caused destruction and ethnic cleansing, bringing
about “a vacuum where a corrupt political class emerged” and
provoking an environment open to venality (Devine andMathisen,
2005, 1). Moreover, the overall weakening of the USSR and the
breakup of the central monitoring system, relative to the past,
yielded an educational structure prone to corruption (Heyneman
et al., 2008). While the decentralization and privatization
processes intensiﬁed the difﬁculties of transition into market
economies for the former USSR (Heyneman et al., 2008), similarly
lacking organization and ethnically driven decentralization within
post-war Bosnia created a fertile ground for corrupt behaviors.
Knowing more about typologies of educational corruption and
quantifying the corruption or the perception of it is a salient and
still evolving research area in education. Challenges present
themselves particularly with attempts to accurately quantify
corruption. This work therefore presumes that, short of witnessing
and effectually measuring corruption, perception of corruption is
broadly accepted as a default indicator of corruption. Transparency
International, for instance, produces annual corruption perception
data to build its widely known Corruption Perception Index. This
study takes the same approach, where the evidence stems from the
data reﬂecting students’ perceptions of corruption.
Corruption research carries inherent risks to researchers.
Exposing corruption may jeopardize the social, economic, and
political positions of those involved. These dynamics make
quantiﬁcation even more difﬁcult. While this study cannot
circumvent or address the nature of the challenges associated
with researching corruption, our study does rely on the empirical
evidence collected at the higher education institutions that
consented to data collection on corruption, often in belief that
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1 This article was derived from a doctoral research, titled “Making of a Voiceless
Youth: Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Higher Education”, which was
defended in 2012 at Columbia University’s Teachers College. This research was
conducted with funding from the International Research and Exchange Board and
Columbia University’s Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern
European Studies.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2016.04.005
0738-0593/ã 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
International Journal of Educational Development 50 (2016) 20–32
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Educational Development
journa l homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / i jedudev
they were considerably less corrupt than their peer institutions.
The later discussed ﬁndings substantiating corruption and corrupt
behaviors in Bosnia and Herzegovina are likely more conservative
estimates of the actual corruption if the study were to be inclusive
of other, arguably more corrupt, higher education institutions.
Moreover, understanding how educational corruption perpet-
uates power of the elites in many developing states is another area
in educational research that calls for further inquiry. Heyneman
(2004) augments the discussion on the role of elites in education
systems by observing that all education systems have “elite
characteristics” (639) and are by nature a selection process, that is
if an elite is deﬁned as onewho is able to enter through the gates of
higher echelons of education. Furthermore, “how selection is
managed is deeply important for maintaining an equality of
education opportunity” (Heyneman, 2004, 639). Nonetheless, the
problem is exacerbated if gatekeepers, in the form of elite and
political leaders willfully shut out members of society from a fair
and merit-based education. In comparison to a system of
meritocracy in education, this subversive system of control cannot
occur without a systematic and broadly designed net of corrupt
activities, difﬁcult to detect yet highly sustainable as it involves
well regulated corridors of networked power, disseminated and
encouraged through a top down process. Waite and Allen (2003)
note that “until we recognize corruption in all its many guises, we,
and those we serve, remain its unwitting victims” (294). Thus, this
study argues that a new classiﬁcation of corruption in education,[112_TD$DIFF]
which takes into account the subversive and widely established
control of elites over the higher education system, [113_TD$DIFF] is needed to
fully gauge the problem of corruption in education and,
particularly, in higher education.
2. Literature review: corruption typologies
Existing research on the topic has aimed at creating typologies
of corruption in order to understand its effects on academia and
beyond (Altbach, 2004; Chapman, 2002; Heyneman, 2004;
Rumyantseva, 2005; Sayed and Bruce, 1998a; Transparency
International, 2007; Waite and Allen, 2003). Broadening research
on the types of educational corruption, Waite and Allen (2003)
were among the ﬁrst to inquire into the unexplored interplay
between power and corruption in education, and ways in which
seeking a collective beneﬁt for a group can both instigate and
perpetuate corruption. In their notable piece on the topic, the
authors look into “an ethnology of corruption and abuse of power
in educational administration” (281). According to their perspec-
tive, the limitation of current research on educational corruption is
immediately evident in the widely accepted deﬁnition of corrup-
tion: corruption is often and generally deﬁned as an individual’s
abuse of public position for his/her own good ( [114_TD$DIFF]Palmer, 1992; Sayed
and Bruce, 1998b). While [111_TD$DIFF]educational corruption is frequently
individually beneﬁcial, Waite and Allen (2003) expand this
deﬁnition by referring to Sayed and Bruce’s (1998b) notion of
collective beneﬁt when deﬁning corruption among the police.
Waite and Allen (2003) view corruption as “any use of power or
position through discrete acts or behavior(s) that beneﬁt an
individual, group, or organization” (282). The authors further
recognize the salience of differentiating not only between
individual and collective forms of corruption, but also “between
haphazard andmore systemic forms of corruption” (289), wherein
Waite and Allen claim that a subtle or haphazard type of corruption
is perfectly embodied in the case of an uninformed member of the
educational administration who has repeatedly used a university
computer for personal activities. Similar to these broader views on
corruption, we “ﬂexibly deﬁne educational corruption as any abuse
of ofﬁcial position that is pursued by an individual for either his/
her beneﬁt or that of his/her class or group” ([115_TD$DIFF]Sabic-El-Rayess, 2013,
p. 6). We go further in this study by delineating the two key types
of corruption: non-pecuniary and pecuniary forms of educational
corruption. Pecuniary forms of corruption involve a bribewhere an
individual, or a group, chooses to abuse his/her ofﬁcial authority to
monetarily beneﬁt by receiving a bribe from another individual, or
a group, that is expecting to receive a favor or beneﬁt in exchange.
Non-pecuniary forms of corruption do not involve a bribe. Favors
are reciprocated instead, and no money exchanges hands. The
question raised and later answered in this study is inwhat forms do
the non-pecuniary forms of corruption manifest within higher
education. We take on this complex issue, but recognize that the
study only begins to address the intricacies of this clandestine
phenomenon.
Others have also classiﬁed corruption and helped determine the
facilitators of corruption-related behaviors (Chapman, 2002;
Heyneman, 2004; Rumyantseva, 2005). The 2013 Global Corrup-
tion Report on Education by Transparency International [116_TD$DIFF]consoli-
dated and exposed myriad forms of corruption; however, while
exploring numerous case studies across the world, it does not
formalize a typology of corruption in education. Moreover, elite-
based corruption as a form of non-pecuniary corruption is not
explored in other studies as a systemic phenomenon with its own
rigorous rules. For example, in the case study on Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Transparency International (2013, 190) only notes
brieﬂy that faculty may exchange grades for access to “social
capital resources” such as “strengthening relationships with
inﬂuential public ﬁgures from political or social life”. This study
however aims to scrutinize such observations through an
empirically based understanding of education corruption arising
from elite [117_TD$DIFF]’s use of favor-based reciprocations.
We recognize that favor reciprocations are part of life and are
plentiful in the course of daily human interaction. They become
problematic when seeded in the abuse of ofﬁcial authority that
beneﬁts either one or more individuals. This is the type of
corruption that we refer to as non-pecuniary corruption. It is
complex and can distort the meritocratic model of higher
education, which is why it is at the core of this study. A group
of professors may choose to promote each other based on their
belonging to a particular ethnic, racial, or religious group rather
than their competence. For instance, if incompetent professors are
promoted based on their background traits rather than their
competence, the quality of teaching would be affected and
damaging to the educational process and society at large ( [118_TD$DIFF]Sabic-
El-Rayess, 2016).
In classifying corruption within educational systems, Chapman
(2002) views corruption as occurring at any level of the
educational governance: at the ministry level, school, region,
classroom, and among international agencies. By introducing a
new set of actors in corruption, Chapman (2002) refers to the
possible corruption schemes among the international actors that
are, often and almost instinctively, presumed to be benevolent
actors in education. Additional examples of the corrupt activities
taking place within the international agencies, per Chapman
(2002), include excessively high payments that are unnecessary
but aimed at obtaining certain services or information, siphoning
funds away from projects, and making decisions on the allocation
of projects not based on the objective evaluations but based on
social, family, or business connections. He also notes that the types
of corruption are diverse and depend on the socio-economic,
political, and cultural context in which they occur.
Rumyantseva (2005) contributes to this discussion by suggest-
ing that educational corruption emerges in various forms,
including, but not limited to, “favoritism in procurement, favorit-
ism in personnel appointments, ghost teachers, selling admissions
and grades, private tutoring, and skimming from project grants”
(84). She insightfully notes that the types of corruption occurring
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within the administration do not impact the values, beliefs, and
future life path of students as directly as the types of corruption
most explicitly involving students. Offering a rich overview of
types of corruption, Rumyantseva focuses on the individual gains
and consequences rather than collective beneﬁts and shared
motivations of those involved in the corrupt activities. Heyneman
(2004) had further enriched the typology research in education
corruption by dividing this type of corruption into: “corruption in
selection, corruption in accreditation, corruption in procurement,
professional misconduct, and corruption in educational property
and taxes” (845), Rumyantseva (2005) posits that there may be
another classiﬁcation allowing for amore nuanced comprehension
of [111_TD$DIFF]educational corruption. She begins by terming those trans-
actions involving students as agents, education-speciﬁc corrup-
tion, breaking this category further into student-faculty exchange,
student-administrator exchange and student-staff exchange (88–
89). Those transactions that do not involve students as agents she
terms administrative corruption. In each of the subcategories of
education-speciﬁc corruption, she argues, corruption arises
through the exchange of bribes and favors for grades, admissions,
or access to transcripts, books, and dormitories.
In addition, Kaufmann and Vicente (2011) create pathways in
understanding the multiple deﬁnitions of corruption, especially
when the notion of legality is considered. Their study uncovers a
new reality created by corruption as it takes into account the
power dynamics of elite behavior and its susceptibility to adapt the
machinery of the state, such as legal frameworks, to its own needs.
Situating elites in a zero sum game of gain and loss, the study
identiﬁes three equilibrium outcomes: the ﬁrst outcome proposes
that illegal corruption ﬂourishes when the elites are allowed or do
not face “binding incentives” to limit corruption; the second
outcome is an alternative that is “centered around legal corrup-
tion” in which there is a cost burden undertaken by the elites “to
legally protect corruption”; the last andmost ideal outcome, “a no-
corruption outcome” engenders a situation in which “the
population is able to effectively react to corruption” (Kaufmann
and Vicente, 2011,195). One step further may be to inquire into the
clandestine mechanisms that are available and of which elites take
advantage to safeguard their reputations. As there are higher costs
to manipulate the legal framework to make corruption legal and
lower costs to take part in illegal corruption (Kaufmann and
Vicente, 2011, 200), maximum gain and minimum loss rules
dictate prevarication in the simplest of activities and simulation of
a façade to preserve both power and lack of accountability. This is
precisely a state of being towardswhich Bosnia’s elites havemoved
the country’s higher education. As discussed and supported by the
empirical evidence in the forthcoming sections, the elite-based
favor reciprocations currently ﬂourish within Bosnia’s higher
education framework, but do so under a system that is seemingly
and publically striving towards becoming an integrated part of the
EU’s higher education area known for its attempt to harmonize
transparency and merit-based mobility across all participating
countries. In Bosnia, little incentive to drastically change the legal
framework exists, although a Law on Pardon was established in
2004 and taken advantage of before it was revoked ([119_TD$DIFF] evine and
Mathisen, [120_TD$DIFF] 005). The Law on Pardon, passed by the parliament and
government of Bosnia in January 2004, was unreported by the
media, emphasizing its furtive purpose to help elites take
advantage of it ([119_TD$DIFF] evine and Mathisen, [120_TD$DIFF] 005). After a member of
parliament (MP) received the ﬁrst pardon, followed by several
more pardons granted to high ofﬁcials, the duplicitous nature of
the law came to the attention of the High Representative who,
then, repealed it (Internal SIDA memo in [121_TD$DIFF] evine and Mathisen, [120_TD$DIFF]
2005).
Being in control of creation and execution of legal frameworks,
the elites of developing countries often exploit the systems to
beneﬁt their collective goals. In the process, favors amongst the
elites are often exchanged through social networks and are not
adequately sanctioned because of the power reinforcement that
these exchanges provide to the elites’ within the closed circles of
power. A version of this corruption-preserves-class-power notion
emerges from Chapman’s (2002) writing, wherein he reasons that
“gatekeepers’ . . . motivation is often economic – to supplement
income – but may also be an effort to extend [155_TD$DIFF]their status or power”
(8).
Though it is needed to achieve a deeper understanding of
educational corruption, literature on the interplay between power,
social mobility, and corruption in the educational sector, in
particular, remains limited. It was only a few years ago that Waite
and Allen (2003) pioneered such an effort. If a society embraces
non merit-based mobility,2 it arguably accepts corruption-related
behavior, since a ﬂawed apparatus other than meritocracy plays a
Table 1
Key research hypotheses.
Sample Size Method
Hypothesis 1: Presence of Corruption:
Corruption in higher education has notable presence
762 Surveys
15 Interviews
Descriptive Stats
Content Analysis
Hypothesis 2: Pecuniary versus Non-Pecuniary Corruption:
Non-pecuniary corruption plays an important role in developing contexts and disproportionally beneﬁts the elites versus
non-elites
762 Surveys
15 Interviews
Descriptive Stats
Content Analysis
Hypothesis 3: Students’ Traits and Non-Pecuniary Corruption
Students’ social standing is key in determining their role in favor-reciprocation processes. Therefore, students’ background
traits shape their view on whether non-pecuniary corruption in their institutions of higher education is existent or not
762 Surveys Binary Logistic
Regression
Model
Dependent:
Y= Passing via Social
Connections
Independents:
X1 =Household Income
X2 = Sex
X3 = Student Type
X4 = Competence Belief
X5 = Father’s Position
[96_TD$DIFF]X6 = Father’s Education
2 Please note that while we recognize the debate onwhat may constitute merit is
ongoing (Jaschik, 2013), this paper presumes that the meritorious mobility in
education constitutes one backed by superior academic performance for student
and by notable expertise, publication record, and excellent teaching for faculty
members.
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key role in determining social standing in a society. To maintain
status quo, those in power tend to leverage educational corruption
for the maintenance of this elite status. The ultimate goal of this
study is to begin decoding what types of educational corruption in
developing settings become systematic and normalized behaviors
that allow the elites to utilize educational institutions for the
maintenance of social inequalities and for turning universities into
likelymechanisms of elite status preservation. This study therefore
presents an empirically supported new typology of corruption that
dissects corrupt behaviors by their pecuniary or non-pecuniary
nature.
2.1. Key research hypotheses
Using mixed methods, we address three key research questions
in the context of the sampled higher education institutions in
Bosnia. The primary proposition of this paper is that educational
corruption plays prominently in higher education institutions in
Bosnia and, furthermore, that the non-pecuniary corruption
beneﬁting elites is particularly concerning and relevant in
addressing corruption in education systems of developing
countries. More speciﬁcally, the study proposes the following
hypotheses (see Table 1):
1. Corruption in higher education is notably present.
2. Non-pecuniary corruption, as manifested in the form of favor
reciprocations, plays a role in higher education institutions,
often beneﬁting the elites.
3. Students’ social standing is key in determining their role in
favor-reciprocation processes. Therefore, whether students [122_TD$DIFF]
view non-pecuniary corruption in their institutions of higher
education as existent or not is dependent on students’
background traits.
The ﬁrst two hypotheses were tested by examining the survey
data as well as by unpacking the content of the semi-structured
interviews conducted with students in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The third hypothesis relied on the binary logistic regressions that
examined whether students’ views on the presence of non-
pecuniary corruption are dependent on background traits of the
participating students. If students’ perceptions of non-pecuniary
forms of corruptionwere shaped by students’ background traits, it
would point to the importance of student background in favor
reciprocations in higher education. The elites and non-elites are
impacted differently by favor reciprocation, and their views on the
presence of non-pecuniary forms of corruption should similarly
differ based on the students’ background traits. Finding the
differential would solidify our theoretical proposition that the
favor reciprocations are beneﬁcial to the elites while the bribes
remain relevant for the poorer segments of the society.
3. Methodological framework: mixed methods approach
As we are curious about corruption intangibly and subtly
affecting the creation of social hierarchies, this study calls for the
recognition of diverse factors that may shape corruption in
education. Inwar-torn countries such as Bosnia, poverty, ethnicity,
wealth, and ultimately one’s personal character may shape one’s
proneness towards corrupt behaviors. More importantly, in fragile
states characterized with high levels of societal corruption,
education tends to reﬂect the societal proneness to criminalized
activities and corrupt behaviors. Most importantly, however, we
argue, it is essential to determine if and to what extent one’s
afﬁliationwith the socio-economic and political elites, impacts the
manner inwhich higher education corruptionmanifests itself. Any
considered policy response to address corruption in education has
to account for the classiﬁcation of corrupt interactions. Our study
broadens current debate on the relevance of corruption in higher
education in developing countries by empirically determining [123_TD$DIFF]
most frequently perceived forms of corruption in higher education
within Bosnia’s higher education system.
This article is derived from a larger mixed-methods empirical
research ([124_TD$DIFF]Sabic-El-Rayess, 2012) with the intent to highlight the
complexity of corrupt behaviors in higher education systems of
fragile and post-war societies. While broader study relies on
elaborate logistic regression modeling, this article zooms in on
several key statistics, trends, and a speciﬁc logistic regression
model that provides deeper insights on non-pecuniary corruption.
All analysis is derived from 762 randomly surveyed and
15 purposely selected and interviewed students from public
higher education institutions in Bosnia. The survey instrument
contained 39 questions though only sub-selected and most
relevant ﬁndings are presented herein. The semi-structured
interview guide consisted of several sub-sections, starting with
the most relevant section for this paper, aimed at addressing
questions on the forms of perceived corruption in higher
education, reasons for its persistency, and facilitators of corrup-
tion.
Given logistic difﬁculty of obtaining data on corruption, the
study is unique in its ability to have compiled and analyzed
substantive data on corruption in higher education. Brieﬂy, we
analyze key descriptive statistics to spell out current trends on the
forms in which corruption manifests itself in Bosnia’s higher
education. The trend analysis was supplemented and further
validated using relevant segments of the broader content analysis
of the interview-based data. Resembling quantitative approach,
the content analysis also looks for repetition of concepts in the
interview-based data. In this study, it has helped uncover the
contextual idiosyncrasies of educational corruption and elites that
could not be observed or detected if the study were exclusively
reliant on survey-based trends alone. Through this method, the
study directly addresses the role of non-pecuniary corruption in
Bosnia’s higher education institutions.
3.1. Content analysis
The content analysis method was ﬁrst developed by Gottschalk
and Gleser (1969). It is generally deﬁned as “a method of studying
and analyzing communications in a systematic, [and] objective
manner . . . ”(Kerlinger, 1986). For this research, the individual
student interviews were ﬁrst transcribed in detail then analyzed
for any potential patterns that could further inform the quantita-
tive analysis and complement other ﬁndings. Gorard and Taylor
(2004) simplify differentiation between quantitative and qualita-
tive research to the narrative nature of the latter that allows the
researcher simply to ask direct questions. Hammersley (1996)
points to the in-depth interviews as informative in formulation of
surveys, illustrating that one methodological approach can be
informed by the other. This study applies the content analysis
method by reducing detailed interview-based data to relevant
themes and looking for patterns and repetition of certain concepts,
with the particular focus on the concepts that played prominently
in the survey-based data.
3.2. Binary logistic regression
As another key piece of the overall analysis, we test whether
students’ perception of a non-pecuniary form of educational
corruption as present (event occurring and coded as 1) or not
(event not occurring and coded as 0) can be explained by their
background characteristics. This approach warrants the use of
simple binary logistics regression. Probit regression was an
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alternative contender, but both tend to yield similar results ( [125_TD$DIFF]Gill,
2001; Greene, 1997 [126_TD$DIFF]). Unlike linear regression, logistic regression
has no strict requirements for the predictors’ distributions ([127_TD$DIFF]Bewick
et al., 2005). Its dependent variable, logit, is expressed as the
natural log of the odds, where the odds capture a ratio between the
probability of the event occurring (p) versus the probability of the
event not occurring (p). The binary logistic regression is expressed
as the Log (odds) = logit (p) = ln (p/1p).
The key prerequisite for the binary logistic regression analysis is
to test the linearity between the logit and predictors, but only for
continuous and ordinal predictors. In the forthcoming model,
predictors for father’s ranking at work (Father’s Position), father’s
level of education (Father’s Education), family’s income ranking
(Household Income), and student’s academic ranking (Student Type)
were all ordinal variables and were therefore tested for the
linearity assumption. The Box-Tidwell Transformation Test is a
technique that determines whether the linearity assumption is
violated or not.3 The Box-Tidwell TransformationTest requires that
for each of the above noted predictors, a new and transformed
variable is created by multiplying the natural log of X with the
predictor X.4 Once transformed, the transformed predictor is
included into a binary logistic regression to determinewhether the
transformed variable’s coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant, which would be
indicative of the linearity assumption’s violation. The Box Tidwell
Test was performed for all of the above noted ordinal predictors
and the linearity assumptions were not violated.5
3.3. Sampling
Despite increasing emergence of the private higher education
institutions, the public higher education remains the main
credentials provider in Bosnia. Therefore, the study sampled
public higher education institutions. Datawas collected at 6 public
higher institutions, which allowed for their students to be
randomly surveyed on the topic of educational corruption.
Presumably, these higher education institutions did not expect
corruption in their institutions to play as prominently as it did,
thereby comparatively it is likely that other institutions declining
to participate in the study were more concerned about the level of
corruption within their institutions. Other institutions had been
approached, but declined to participate given the nature of the
research. Considering these circumstances, this paper is based on
one of the larger empirical efforts on the topic in the area of higher
education in the Balkans. The randomly surveyed sample totaled to
762 students, but the sampling process was further enriched by
interviewing a smaller sample of students who were purposely
approached through a network of in-country contacts. In total,
15 students accepted an invitation to participate in this research
and openly discuss corruption.
Given Bosnia’s societal sensitivity towards corruption, the
names of the six public faculties were coded from F1 through F6.
Overall, surveyed sample [128_TD$DIFF](Table 2), closely resembles general traits
of the higher education populations in Bosnia, in terms of
graduation rates and gender composition ( [129_TD$DIFF]Sabic-El-Rayess, 2012,
2014, 2016). The majority of students surveyed were ﬁrst year
students with declining participation by students who were
sophomores, juniors, and seniors (Table 2). This is primarily the
case due to the high dropout rates in Bosnia and, as later discussed,
the nature of corrupt behaviors that are pushing out certain
subgroups of students from the higher education arena. In terms of
their household income, participants’ socioeconomic proﬁle
resembled that of the country while the mono-ethnic composition
of the sample was reﬂective of the ethnic proﬁle of the faculties
where permission to collect data was secured (Table 2). While the
study may have beneﬁted from a more diverse ethnic composition
of the sample, it is generally presumed that ethnicity does not
impact the frequency with which corruption occurs in higher
education in Bosnia. Issues of corruption have been consistently
reported within both ethnic entities in Bosnia. More importantly,
the study’s relevance surpasses the region in question to have
broader implications for our understanding of corruption dynam-
ics in fragile states.
4. Findings and analysis: favor reciprocation theory in
education
The importance of education, especially post-secondary edu-
cation, has risen signiﬁcantly in recent decades to better serve
what is now known as the knowledge society. As education holds
greater currency, we ascertain the irony in the way today’s
knowledge society, a term deﬁned by UNESCO World Report to
include [130_TD$DIFF]cultural diversity, equal access to education, [131_TD$DIFF]universal
access to information (in the public domain), and freedom of
expression [132_TD$DIFF]can propel greater corruption when in trying to meet
the demands for new skills, students meet exploitative conditions
set by rent seeking, and power wielding actors [133_TD$DIFF](UNESCO World
Report, p. 31). This is due to the high stakes nature of higher
education and its link to better employment and other emblems of
Table 2
Sample composition.
VARIABLE % OF STUDENTS # OF STUDENTS
SEX
Female 64 488
Male 34 259
No answer/Not applicable 2 15
ETHNICITY
Bosniaks 96 732
Croats 2 15
Serb 0.01 1
Bosnians 2 14
YEAR IN SCHOOL
1st year students 48.0 366
2nd year students 32.9 251
3rd year students 11.7 89
4th year students 6.7 51
No answer/Not applicable 0.7 5
FACULTY COMPOSITION
F1 13.4 102
F2 8.9 68
F3 26.4 201
F4 21.9 167
F5 25.6 195
F6 3.8 29
HOUSEHOLD INCOME (HI)
HI<500 21.5 165
500<HI<1500 57.2 438
1500<HI<2500 14.0 107
2500<HI<3500 2.3 18
3500<HI 2.6 20
No answer/Not applicable 2.3 18
Source: [97_TD$DIFF]Sabic-El-Rayess (2012).
3 In the event the linearity assumption has been violated, the variable in question
would be restructured as dummy variables and, in that new form, could be
incorporated into the binary logistic regression model.
4 Transformed Variable of X=X lnX
5 The following transformed variables were ﬁrst computed: Transformed Father’s
Position,Transformed Father’s Education, Transformed Three-Level Family Income, and
Transformed Student Type. Resulting from the Box-Tidwell testing, we determined
that the linearity assumptions were not violated for any of the tested predictors.
Therefore, the predictors were used in regression modeling in their original form.
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success. The lack of enforcement of laws compounded by a weak
judicial process and accountability ensure that well-connected
elites not receive punishment for their corrupt behavior. Their
cases, if they reach the courts, are routinely “stalled or postponed”
(Devine and Mathisen, 2005, 23). Thus, the model this paper tests
portrays that students’ high socioeconomic status for favor
reciprocation helps them to mitigate the extenuating circum-
stances that corruption presents, while less connected and poor
students suffer.
4.1. Presence of corruption
The study’s ﬁndings on the presence of corruption in Bosnia’s
higher education show that overall, the corruption is notably
present in the sampled higher education institutions. Given
rigorous sampling methodology and size of the randomly chosen
sample, this presence of corruption is presumed largely reﬂective
of the public education system in Bosnia and, likely, mirrors many
higher education institutions throughout the developing world. Of
the total surveyed sample, only 8.5% of surveyed students viewed
corruption as “completely absent”. Moreover, 45.4% of the sampled
student body stated that corruption is “neither widespread nor
absent”, but 22.3% of the sampled population believed that
corruption is “widespread” and 8.9% declared that corruption is
“highlywidespread” (Fig.1). In sum, of 762 surveyed students, only
8.5% view corruption as “completely absent,” while a signiﬁcant
portion of the sample, 88.7%, believes corruption is present to
some degree (Fig. 1). Only 2.8% of the surveyed participants opted
out of the question.
Similarly, the interviewed group overall agreed that corruption
was present in the educational system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The extent and presence of corruptionwas also discussed with the
pool of 15 interviewed students. One of the interviewed students
noted that while educational corruption does not occupy a
spotlight on a daily basis in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
it is a daily occurrence in the educational process (Interviewee 6C).
The issue partly rests with the institutions’ implicit endorsement
of corrupt behavior: it is not in the interest of the universities to
disclose the information on the presence of corruption and its
extent (Interviewee 1C).
In deﬁning corruption within Bosnia’s higher education, only
2 interviewed students perceived corruption as “the criminal
activity that involves the acceptance or giving of bribery,”while the
remainder demarcated it more broadly as a cluster of activities
ranging from bribery to reciprocation of favors among the social
elite (Table 3). Among those who described corruption more
broadly including the forms of non-monetary exchanges as well,
interviewee 9C estimated that favor exchanges comprise about
80% of all corruption-related activities in higher education, while
about 20% is left to the bribing process (Table 3).
Notably, the two interviewed individuals who believe that
corruption is limited only to the bribing process were also
politically active in their community. Interviewee 1C not only
opted for the more limited deﬁnition of corruption but underlined
that favor reciprocation is a form of nepotism not solely linked to
the elites but is also culturally practiced. Interviewee 1C also
remarked that professors look at the politically involved student
“more seriously and with different eyes.” The student further
attributed his own personal success to hard work, reiterating that
he has had no problems or barriers in the course of his studies. The
above evidence shows that the student who is caught within the
machinery of corruption is unlikely to give a disinterested view of
this crisis. Furthermore, the three interviewees who stated they
were socio-politically “highly involved” were also on the lower-
end of the student estimates as to the extent of corruption.
Speciﬁcally, interviewees 1C, 11C, and 15C remarked that “30–40%
of professors” are corrupt; corruption is “present, but not
widespread”; and “50% of professors” are corrupt, respectively.
Those students who declared they were less involved socio-
politicallywithin their communities often gave higher estimates of
how widespread corruption is than those who claimed to have
been “highly involved”. The study ﬁnds that 2 out of 3 students
who remarked theywere “somewhat involved” estimated that 70%
of their professors are corrupt (Table 3). Also, the “somewhat
uninvolved” student who graduated from a public university and
later gained employment as a teaching assistant at a different
university stated that corruption was even more widespread: the
student perceived 90% to 95% of faculty members as corrupt
(Table 3). Though the sample size of 15 students is a limiting factor
here, the patterns extrapolated from the available transcripts are
suggestive of the previously hypothesized notion that corruption is
perceived as less widespread by the most politically and socially
prominent students who are also the ones most likely to beneﬁt
from their access to the social elites and their ability to leverage the
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Extent of corruption in sampled higher education institutions.
Source: Surveys.
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elites’ social networks. In the next sub-section, the study continues
to probe this notion indirectly by examining the types of
corruption most frequently observed in Bosnia’s higher education.
4.2. Corruption typology reﬂecting favor-reciprocation model
Here, we reﬂect upon the exhaustive list of corruption forms
that are presently practiced in Bosnia’s higher education.
Addressing one of our key research questions on the forms of
corruption (Table 1), we theorize that students face various types
of corruption during their education; accordingly, we portray a
comprehensive picture, which includes the myriad types of
corruption in Bosnia’s higher education. In doing so, we draw
on the most relevant survey- and interview-based data.
As noted in the literature review, corruption in education can
take on various forms. Herein, both interviewees and surveyed
students conﬁrmed the existence of diverse types of corruption as
manifested in Bosnia’s higher education. Of 762 surveyed partic-
ipants, 8.8% of the sample was of the view that corruption appears
in no form within Bosnia’s higher education while the two most
frequently occurring forms of corruption involve passing exams by
relying on personal connections and inﬂuential parents (Fig. 2).
While not an unlikely scenario for the non-elites, repeatedly failing
an individual of social importance would rarely occur. In other
words, “connections and acquaintances are the key” to one’s
success, and it may often be the case that “the poor have to pay
[emphasis added] while those with higher status only use their
connections” (Interviewee 5C). Simply said, some students in
Table 3
Corruption deﬁnition and presence matrix.
Code Socio-Political
Involvement
Corruption
perceived as bribery
Corruption perceived as bribery, favor
reciprocity, other immoral behavior
Perceived extent of corruption
1C Highly Involved U 30–40% of professors
2C Uninvolved U Highly widespread
3C Uninvolved U Very frequent
4C Uninvolved U Highly widespread
5C Uninvolved U Highly widespread
6C Somewhat
Involved
U 70%
7C Uninvolved U 80%
8C Somewhat
Involved
U 70%
9C8 Somewhat
Uninvolved
U Increases during the exam period. About 90–95% are corrupt. This is
based on the faculty where I work.
10C Uninvolved U 90%
11C Highly Involved U Present, but not widespread
12C Uninvolved U 70%
13C Uninvolved U Only began studies and cannot evaluate
14C Somewhat
Involved
U Present
15C Highly Involved U Present, about 50% of professors
TOTAL Uninvolved 2 13
Source: Interviews
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Forms of educational corruption.
Source: Surveys
8 After graduation, this interviewee obtained a job as a teaching assistant at
another public faculty.
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Bosnia work hard but those who are well connected socially
advance in college and, often, post-college at the expense of the
hard-working individuals by taking what should have been their
jobs (Interviewee 5C).
4.3. Theory in action: favors are for rich and bribes are for poor
Themost frequently noted form of corruption in Bosnian higher
education does not involve monetary exchange but rather the
reciprocity of favors: more speciﬁcally, a signiﬁcant majority or
62.1% of the student body (473 of surveyed students) thought that
corruption appears in the form of “passing exams because of one’s
social connections” (Fig. 2). The data collected via interviews
similarly suggest that the reciprocity of favors is one of the key
articulations of educational corruption in Bosnian higher educa-
tion and, in the view of some, the dominant one. Often, direct
exchanges of money in the educational system to secure grades or
diplomas are seen as less frequent relative to favor exchanges
(Interviewee 4C; Interviewee 5C; Interviewee 7C). Reiterating that
the poor tend to bribe and the elites resort to their access to the
inﬂuential and powerful, another participant referred to a
colleague who used social connections to enroll into college.
The well-connected student explicitly said: “I have the privilege to
enter college without any criteria” (Interviewee 14C).
Consequently, students perceive corruption as no longer
involving tangible goods but exchanges of jobs, favors, and
promises. Out of 15 interviewed students, 9 students believe that
corruption in higher education is a result of interconnectedness
and in service of an elite described as, for instance, “local power-
holders” (Interviewee 1C), “local leaders” (Interviewee 2C),
“people with political power” (Interviewee 3C), “those who are
politically suitable” (Interviewee 4C), and “people in power”
(Interviewee 8C). It is precisely this evolving nature of corruption
resulting from the interconnectedness between the educational
and political elite that makes comprehensive veriﬁcation, detec-
tion, and proper quantiﬁcation of corruption highly complex.
Therefore, this study relies solely on student perception as
indicative proxy of what may be taking place in actuality and
within the country’s higher education.
Drawing on the analysis of students’ perceptions regarding
various forms of educational corruption, the study conﬁrms that
materialistic exchange is not the sole source of corrupt behavior.
Indeed, “favor-for-favor” is another form of corruption, producing a
college-educated cadre among which some are believed to have
never even taken an exam (Interviewee 3C). As another student
observed, when going through the admissions process, it is
important to have someone who will “speak on your behalf as
grades do not speak for themselves” (Interviewee 15C). So, the
student’s background may turn out to be the most relevant factor
in the admissions process, diminishing the importance of
academic success and merit as a measure of student’s perfor-
mance.
While the political elites operate based on the principle of “I do
it for you, you do it for me,” those who lack strong connections
“work hard and repeat years endlessly until either one or the other
gives up [professor or the student] . . . or they will take a loan to
bribe the professor or if the student is female, she will sleep with
the professor” (Interviewee 7C). Even the professors who reject
corruption and wish to differentiate themselves from the corrupt
circles are frequently forced to take part in the corrupt process:
they “pass students against their [professors’] own will. It is all
systemically connected” (Interviewee 3C) and those that reject or
resist corruption may be deemed unsuitable for their positions.
They are often politically marginalized and replaced by “little
[gods] that listen” (Interviewee 4C). Here, one’s list of academic
publications is irrelevant relative to one’s political suitability
(Interviewee 4C).
The second most frequently occurring form of corruption
helped validate the hypothesis that the reciprocity of favors plays a
crucial role in complicating educational corruption: 50.8% of the
surveyed sample believe that educational corruption appears in
the form of “passing because of one’s inﬂuential parents,” which
reﬂects a very similar notion as does the earlier noted statistic that
62.1% of the surveyed student thought corruption appears in the
form of “passing exams because of one’s social connections”
(Fig. 2). This ﬁnding not only conﬁrmed that students perceive
favor-for-favor exchanges as corruption but has also tested one of
the key premises of this research: it conﬁrmed the importance of
favor reciprocity and consequent implications for the social
mobility mechanisms stemming from the students’ perceptions
of favor-for-favor exchanges as corruption.
The notion that this paper brings into the limelight is the
complexity of non-pecuniary corruption, making educational
corruption even more of an intractable activity than it might have
been initially perceived to be. Even with bribery that could
arguably be traced, there are rarely direct exchanges of money;
instead, the exchanges frequently include multiple steps designed
to shroud those involved. For instance, one participant witnessed
an incident where “a student walked in during the S [code for the
course] exam, and said to the professor, ‘Dad said you should stop
by to pick it up,’ and professor replied, ‘Give me your indeks6’ to
[presumably] write in the grade for the exam that was in session”
(Interviewee 2C). This exchange occurred andwas uninterrupted in
front of the entire class.
The dichotomy between the elites and non-elites in how they
operate and interact within higher education institutions is
obviated in the following comment made by one of the study
participants who went on to take a teaching assistantship job at
his/her institution:
[134_TD$DIFF]“My colleague is completing a doctorate in Croatia with one of
the, supposedly, prominent names in the ﬁeld. He is constantly
dining with the professor from Croatia. I suspect that is how he
is getting his doctorate. I, on the other hand, have beenworking
for years onmy doctorate, and everyone is surprised that I want
to do it legitimately and that I am taking so long to complete it.
(Interviewee 9C[135_TD$DIFF])”
This statement illustrates the severity of educational corruption
and the consequent differentiation between the elites and non-
elites, extending beyond students into the faculty arena. In fact, the
social exchanges amongst the privileged remain a relevant social
dynamic even after graduation and especially when it comes to the
public sector employment: a Bosnian public faculty graduate who
sought to work as a teaching assistant post-graduation met with
the dean of her faculty and expressed her interest in staying on as a
teaching assistant. Given her exceptional performance as a student,
she expected the faculty dean to be interested in discussing
employment opportunities with her. However, this faculty’s dean
rejected her by saying: “I do not employ social cases . . . your
parents are unemployed” (Interviewee 4C). The dean effectively
disassociated himself or his faculty with a family of no social
signiﬁcance or ﬁnancial backing. This ﬁnding helps validate the
relevance of social networking that continues post-graduation and
beyond educational sector, as well as this study’s hypothesis that
relationship leveraging is utilized only when the two sides
involved recognize their mutually equivalent social and political
status.
6 Indeks is a gradebook in Bosnia.
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4.3.1. Students’ background on non- [136_TD$DIFF]pecuniary corruption: binary
logistic regression
Our favor reciprocation theory is seeded in a broader idea that
the elites differentiate themselves from the others for the purpose
of controlling societal resources. The selection of the privileged few
is inherently based on protecting the elite status and creating the
access barriers for other groups. When not based on merited
selection, the elites tend to choose their members based on
background traits, ranging from aristocratic lineage to wealth. In
the studied context of Bosnia’s higher education, we similarly
theorize that the elites differentiate students based on their
background traits, including students’ social connectivity to the
existing elites. Given that we are not privy to the elite’s complex
and clandestine selection process, we tested whether students’
view on the existence of the key non-pecuniary form of corruption,
Passing via Social Connections, is indeed determined by students’
background traits. The students’ perceptions of corruption are
presumably indicative of the students’ own experiences with
corruption, where the elites are presumably likelier to beneﬁt
while the poorer segments of the society may be more adversely
affected.
Of all non-pecuniary forms of corruption (Fig. 2), students pass
via social connections (Passing via Social Connections) is the most
frequently occurring type. This type of corruption allows one to
leverage favor reciprocations to unfairly beneﬁt in education. The
frequency with which this form of corruption is observed in our
data, both qualitative and quantitative, provides the initial yet key
evidence that favor reciprocations are live and well amongst the
socially powerful elites.
To further test this relationship, we tested if students’ belief in
the occurrence of Passing via Social Connections can be explained
using student background traits, including Household Income, Sex,
Student Type, Competency Belief, Father’s Position,[137_TD$DIFF] Father’s Education
and Student Type. Direct questions on the students’ afﬁliation with
the elites would have adversely impacted students’ willingness to
participate in the survey. So, to examine the complex relation of the
elite status and non-pecuniary corruption, we extracted the key
sub-set of students’backgroundvariables fromthe survey (Table 4),
where these variables have collectively served as a proxy of the
student’s social status. Students were extensively questioned on
their background and their perceptions of corruption. Namely, we
collected data on students’ household income (Household Income),
students’ past academic performance (Student Type), father’s
education (Father’s Education), father’s position within his
company or institution (Father’s Position[137_TD$DIFF]), gender (Sex), and
students’ views onwhether competence is relevant in determining
the efﬁciency with which their peers graduate (Competency Belief).
Of the independent variables, Father’s Position[137_TD$DIFF] reﬂects students’
social status prominently as it differentiates between fathers who
are blue-collar workers, those who are white-collar works, those
that are in executive positions, and the ones that lead institutional
entities (Table 4). As for the socio-economic background,
Household Income groups participating students into three
categories of low, medium, and high income families. We also
captured students’ past academic performance to proﬁle them by
Student Type: excellent, very good, good, or satisfactory (Table 4).
Another variable looked at father’s educational background
(Father’s Education) by levels ranging from the primary to higher
education. Sex, a key demographic trait, may also signify
differential experiences and, therefore, views of corruption given
the presence of sexual favors for passing grades. These select
predictors were derived from a 39-question-survey and appropri-
ately coded for the use in the binary logistic regression.
We begin by providing a broader understanding of the
regression results before tackling the speciﬁcs of the relationships
within the regression model. First, the binary logistic regression
validated ﬁndings derived from other aspects of our analysis: the
students’ views on non-pecuniary corruptionwere strongly tied to
the students’ background traits, which were reﬂective of the
Table 4
List of relevant variables.
VARIABLE NAME VALUES9 VARIABLE TYPE SURVEY QUESTION
Passing via Social Connections Yes = 1 Dependent 17: Which forms does corruption take [98_TD$DIFF]?
No=0 Passing via Social Connections?
Household Income 500KM [99_TD$DIFF]–1500KM=1 Predictor 34: Please indicate your average monthly household income?
1500KM[100_TD$DIFF]–2500KM=2
2500KM–3500+KM=3
Sex Male = 1 Predictor 2: What is your gender?
Female = 0
Student Type Excellent = 1 Predictor 4: What type of student were you in high-school?
Very good=2
Good/Satisfactory = 3
Father’s Position [101_TD$DIFF]Worker =1 Predictor 37: What has been your father’s highest position?
Intellectual but not executive=2,
Executive = 3,
Director/Owner/Head of Organization = 4
Father’s Education Elementary =1 Predictor 35. What is the highest degree obtained by your father?
Secondary = 2
Two-Year College= 3
College or Higher = 4
Competency Belief Always =1 Predictor 10. Are the most competent amongst your peers ﬁrst to graduate?
Almost Always= 2
Often=3
Rarely or Never = 4
9 Please note that all variables are recoded as appropriate. For instance, if too few
observations were initially recorded under a particular category, such category was
aggregated with another category.
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students’ overall social standing. Namely, the father’s position
within a company was a signiﬁcant factor inwhether students saw
non-pecuniary corruption as occurring or not. In fact, a student
whose father is a worker, intellectual or even an executive, was
signiﬁcantly more likely to perceive Passing via Social Connections
as existent than was the case with students whose father was a
CEO, Director, or owner of the company. This pioneering ﬁnding
quantiﬁed the novel relationship between the students’ percep-
tions of non-pecuniary corruption and their fathers’ business
positions. Even more importantly, this relationship conﬁrmed that
there was a signiﬁcant differential between the students whose
fathers belonged to the highest echelon of the social hierarchy and
those who were of the lesser social standing. The ﬁnding, in turn,
reinforced our theoretical line of argument that variations in
perceptions on corruption exist due to differential experiences
between the elites and non-elites.
To elaborate, the odds of stating that they viewed Passing via
Social Connections as occurring were 0.415 (Table 5) times higher
for those students whose fathers were workers than for those
students whose fathers were CEOs, Owners, or Directors of
businesses or institutions. Students, with fathers at the top of
the social hierarchy (i.e. CEOs, Owners, and Directors), belonged to
the referential group7 for this particular predictor. Therefore, all
other categories within the predictor are individually compared to
the reference group. Similarly, students whose fathers were
intellectuals or executives in their companies were 0.260
(p<0.01) and 0.422 (p<0.05) times likelier, respectively, to see
non-pecuniary corruption as occurring versus not.
Similarly, the relationship between students’ views on the
existence of non-pecuniary corruption and household incomewas [138_TD$DIFF]
notable. Students from the lower andmiddle-income familieswere
2.312 (p<0.01) and 2.913 (p<0.01) times more likely, respective-
ly, to view Passing via Social Connections as existent than the
students from the households with the highest income. In other
words, the elites were less likely to report non-pecuniary forms of
corruption as the elites constitute the subgroup most likely to
beneﬁt from their social connections.
Another relationship that proved signiﬁcant was that of the
student’s gender to his/her view on non-pecuniary corruption.
Women were signiﬁcantly more likely to report non-pecuniary
corruption as existent, and this may be related to the females’
greater exposure to requests for sexual favors. Amongst the
students interviewed for this study, one female student shared her
experience with sexual requests from a faculty member through-
out her studies, resulting in her eventual transition froma full-time
to a part-time student and mistrust in the educational system
overall. In this model speciﬁcally, women were 1.674 (p<0.01)
times more likely to see Passing via Social Connection as existent
versus males. Also, those students who ﬁrmly believed in
competence when it comes to how quickly one graduates in
Bosnia’s higher education were also 0.270 times likelier to report
Passing via Social Connections as existent relative to the students
who believed competent never graduate ﬁrst. Reﬂecting an
interesting dynamic, students who doubt the role of competence
in one’s study completion are less likely to report non-pecuniary
corruption as existent. Those students may be beneﬁting from
their social connections and, thus, deem competence in the
graduation process a non-factor. Additionally, students’ academic
proﬁles did not impact their perceptions of non-pecuniary
corruption. Similarly, fathers’ educational proﬁles had no bearing
on students’ perceptions. Interestingly, no relationship between
the academic success of the students and, similarly, their fathers’
suggests that educationmay not playmost prominently in forming
students’ views on the state of their educational systems when
corruption creates systemic distortions. It is instead the social
standing and connectivity to the pockets of political, social, and
economic power that shape the behaviors and views of students in
Bosnia’s higher education.
Table 5
Binary logistic regression model on Passing via Social Connections.
Variable Odds Ratio
Father’s Position [102_TD$DIFF](FP1) 0.415*
Worker = 1
All else = 0
Father’s Position [103_TD$DIFF]2 (FP2) 0.260**
Intellectual = 1
All else = 0
Father’ Position Rank [104_TD$DIFF](FP3) 0.422*
Executive = 1
All else = 0
Father’s Education 1 (FE1) 1.231
Elementary = 1
All else = 0
Father’s Education 2 (FE2) 1.249
Secondary = 1
All else = 0
Father’s Education (FE3) 1.125
Two-Year College =1
All else = 0
Household Income 1 (HI1) 2.312* [105_TD$DIFF]
500KM-1500KM=1
All else = 0
Household Income 2 (HI2) 2.913*[106_TD$DIFF]
1500KM-2500KM=1
All else = 0
Sex (Sex) 1.674** [107_TD$DIFF]
Male = 1
Female = 0
Student Type (ST1) 1.281
Excellent =1
All else = 0
Student Type (ST2) 1.296
Very Good=1
All else = 0
Competency Belief 1 (CB1) 0.270** [108_TD$DIFF]
Always= 1
All else = 0
Competency Belief 1 (CB2) 0.708
Almost Always = 1
All else = 0
Competency Belief (CB3) 0.659
Often= 1
All else = 0
Constant 1.577
Chi-square, df 37.863** [109_TD$DIFF], 14
% of Cases Correctly Predicted 70.5
[110_TD$DIFF]* p< .01.
** p< .001.
7 In binary logistic regression, SPSS uses Indicator coding for all categorical
variables. The highest number in terms of categories (i.e. 5 if the categories are 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5) is by default the reference group that all other groups within the
categorical variable are compared to.
A. Sabic-El-Rayess, N.N. Mansur / International Journal of Educational Development 50 (2016) 20–32 29
a Favors for war-time achievements
The form of corruption that was discussed earlier and in the
context of post-war and post-communist elite formation is the
process of diploma awards that took place immediately after the
war. The Bosnian Army leadership during the war was comprised
of very few formally trainedmilitary ofﬁcials who left the Yugoslav
Army to join the Bosnian Army. So, to reciprocate for one’s war
achievements and heroic participation, many high-level military
ofﬁcials received diplomas. As a research participant openly stated,
the participant’s father, who played a prominent role in military
leadership during the war, was awarded a diploma from a higher
education institution “because of his participation in the war”
(Interviewee 3C). Soon after the war ended, the members of the
new elite were frequently rewarded for their war-related efforts or
their participation in the nationalistic politics during and after the
1990s war. Further conﬁrmed by another study participant, a
prominent individual in the participant’s ﬁeld of study was a
former war hero who, prior to the war, had only a high school
diploma, but immediately following the cessation of violence
obtained several college degrees and now heads a prominent
public company. As the interviewee further notes, “this is a public
secret . . . . I never saw him at the [faculty] . . . where one percent
graduates in time [meaning graduating within 4 years] and he was
one [of them]. Others who graduate in time usually do so with a
damaged nervous system” (Interviewee 4C).
In sum, the leaders of the war-time armed forces were self-
driven individuals who rose to their positions during the actual
ﬁghting with Serbia’s army and the war-time army of Serb
Republic. However, following the cessation of violence, many of
these newly emerged leaders entered a post-war era in which
construction of the newandmultiethnic Bosnian Armywas guided
by the international community. In the process, certain require-
ments were placed upon the military leadership in terms of their
education and academic qualiﬁcations, which in many cases the
military ofﬁcers from Bosnia lacked. To resolve the dichotomy
between actual competence in the ﬁeld shown during the war and
the lack of formal academic and military training, many members
of the military were helped in the process of obtaining their higher
education diplomas: “With the lack of other awards, some
individuals were awarded diplomas in appreciation for their war
achievements” (Interviewee C4). While this form of privilege given
to the war leaders and heroes could have been, in some instances,
justiﬁedwith the award of honorary degrees, this privileging of the
newly emerging elites extended beyond a few selective cases,
tilting the country’s higher education towards the non-pecuniary
versus pecuniary corruption model that correlates to one’s
belonging to the elite echelons in the country.
b Pecuniary corruption
While favor reciprocations amongst the elites played most
prominently within both survey- and interview-based data, [139_TD$DIFF]
pecuniary forms of corruptions remained relevant as well. Of the
total surveyed sample, 339 students or 44.5% viewed corruption in
the form of “purchased passing grades,”while a smaller segment of
the sampled group,19.2%, stated that corruption manifests itself in
the form of “purchased diplomas” (see Fig. 2). At times, professors
may insist on getting their bribes by repeatedly failing a student,
signaling to the student that he/she needs to pay to pass, even
though doing so may involve signiﬁcant ﬁnancial sacriﬁce for the
family. This is likelier to occur when students lack access to the
circles of inﬂuence and power. In fact, “it is normal that students
who are of the worst economic circumstances have a harder time
passing their exams. They do not have or do not knowwhere to pay
for their exams; thus, they are forced to study” (Interviewee 1C).
Thus, a cyclic victimization sets into place for non-elite students,
and especially those who are most struggling ﬁnancially, as they
continue to fail and may eventually be ﬁltered out of the system
unless they can meet the bribery demands.
c Culture of entitlement and intimidation
In a politically tense setting, such as that of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, [140_TD$DIFF]analyses or observations of educational issues cannot
occur in a vacuum away from contextual pressures. Many of the
administrative roles in the educational system of Bosnia are
decided by political factors rather than merit, which causes many
students to see politics as not only being intertwined with
educational processes but also as being in control of them
(Interviewee 2C, Interviewee 3C, Interviewee 4C). Some study
participants have emphasized both their own fear of the corrupt
and dominant circles but also the fear felt by those professors or
teaching assistants who face threats because they demand
knowledge regardless of one’s political or social status. There
are instanceswhere professors have had to “pass a student because
the professor was afraid” (Interviewee 3C). The same study
participant further suggested that “there are professorswhowould
do as they should but cannot say no to politics and are forced to
pass . . . regardless of their own moral and ethical principles”
(Interviewee 3C). Others reiterated that the saying, “favor for favor,
you will need me later” is the modus operandi of Bosnia’s corrupt
educational system, while political pressure and threats are also
utilized when the members of the academic cadre seem less
obedient (Interviewee 4C).
Some of themost persistent professorswho attempt to distance
themselves from the corrupt echelons go as far as to require a
student to ﬁnd a witness for an oral exam to send the message to
the student population and faculty administration that a passing
grade for their exam cannot be bought or awarded via connections.
One of the participants faced such a situation where a professor
refused to examine the candidate without at least one student
witness to listen in on the exam (Interviewee 3C). This approach is
a logistical burden on a student, but, more importantly, reﬂects the
extreme measures taken by uncorrupt professors in their attempt
to differentiate themselves from the corrupt circles. Moreover, it is
further indicative of the systemic lack of support for those
professors who wish to separate themselves from the corrupt and
dominant elite.
Another element of the higher education arena and the post-
socialist culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an inherited
mentality of control and dominance. The need for social
importance and systemic control is highly pronounced in this
post-socialist system, where those who are socially relevant seek
some type of control and frequently feel compelled to reiterate
their own self-importance (Interviewee 4C). In academia, this
exhibitionist behavior often takes the form of referring to the
inferiority of others. The sense of inferiority, combined with the
fear of taking action against corruption publicly, ensures that
students “only talk but do little” (Interviewee 5C). Young students
can easily be subjected to the exercise of authority and power, so
the university is a suitable setting for applying the socialist
mentality still present within the system. In other words, “we in
the post-socialist society suffer from the syndrome of having the
need to show power in order to please ourselves . . . and
professors manifest this syndrome by exercising their power and
authority through their professorships and their grading” over the
susceptible and vulnerable student population (Interviewee 4C).
Another prevalent source of fear is students’ awareness that the
mechanisms or committees to punish the perpetrators of
corruption are either absent or devised by the individuals likely
involved in corruption themselves (Interviewee 4C, Interviewee
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5C). Consequently, the verbal and systemic intimidation ensures
students’ obedience and silence in dealing with the ongoing
corruption and turpitude in higher education in the country. In
short, this study conﬁrmed the presence of educational corruption,
as well as the dominance of non-monetary forms of corruption
over bribery.
4.4. Favor reciprocations model
The forthcoming analysis ﬁnds that those of the lower
socioeconomic status are likelier to bribe if and when needed
while the elites rely on their access to power and inﬂuence over the
higher education. The efforts to conceal corrupt activities often
make it difﬁcult to determine the beneﬁciaries of corrupt
behaviors, but Lomnitz (2002) has insightfully observed that
“material payment in return for favors is graft. It means the
absence of any possibility of personal relationship of having friends
in common. Accepting a bribe is an acknowledgement of social
inferiority, like accepting a tip or gratuity” (44 as cited in
Granovetter, 2007). Leveraging Lomnitz’s conception of the
relationship between power, social class, and corruption onto
the educational arena, one would expect moneys are not always
paid for grades, diplomas, or undeserved professorships—espe-
cially among the privileged while those of unprivileged social
backgrounds would be the ones to engage in offering bribes.
In fact, the study further ﬁnds that accepting a bribe from a
social equal is not only discouraged because of the stigma
associated with asking a social equal for [141_TD$DIFF]a bribe. Instead, a one-
time bribe is deemed amore appropriate form of corruption for the
poorer and less inﬂuential individuals,[142_TD$DIFF] given their limited social
and political power to reciprocate favors. A one-time payment is
deemed of lesser value than the potential reciprocation that may
be gained from executing a favor for a socially prominent
individual. In simple terms, when elites engage in corrupt
processes, they share a mutual understanding that the favor
exchanges are likely to have much greater rate of return than one-
time bribes. Consequently, if the educational system is fragmented
and susceptible to corrupt practices, the favor reciprocation
processes are likely to ﬂourish because de novo elites are eager
to preserve their newly gained positions of power and alter the
social mobility model so that it works to their favor. Supported by
the evidence stemming both from qualitative and quantitative
analyses, in the post-conﬂict or post-crisis settings elites often
leverage opportune moment to expand their control over
education, consequently impacting social mobility by espousing
elites’ favor reciprocation process that beneﬁts few and adversely
impacts the rest. Our study demonstrates that, depending on their
background traits that serve as the proxy for their social status,
students have different perceptions of non-pecuniary corruption.
A frequent reciprocation of favors amongst the elites is
distortive to the educational system. At times, it is an unspoken,
yet mutual, understanding between two or more parties that the
exchange of favors will occur between, for instance, party A and
party B (Fig. 3). The favor exchange may not always transpire
simultaneously and its content may often not be speciﬁed
immediately. In other words, the form, value, and timing of the
reciprocal favor may not be detailed at the onset of the interaction
between the parties engaging in favor reciprocation (Fig. 3). When
Party A asks for a favor, Party A is, in essence, seeking a non-
monetary loan that is often given for an unspeciﬁed time, likely
with an undetermined repayment value, and oftenwith undeﬁned
content of that future repayment. When Party B chooses to
afﬁrmatively respond to the request, Party B often does not specify
the details of the reciprocation though an unspeciﬁed expectation
that a favor will be reciprocated always underlines a premise of
such requests. In other cases, Party B may share particulars of the
reciprocity expectations, and parties may even engage in
negotiations. As a result, Party A may or may not proceed with
the acceptance of the favor exchange parameters, but if Party A
ultimately accepts, the favor exchange is agreed upon. Importantly,
such favor reciprocations are assumed to occur only when party A
and party B have an underlining understanding that they are of an
equivalent social standing. If either Party A or Party B loses their
elite status, the underlining expectations of reciprocation are often
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. Favor reciprocation model.
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nulled. Simply said, when it comes to favor reciprocations, both
parties expect to beneﬁt from each other’s social equivalency and
power, otherwise they would likely engage in bribery rather than
favor reciprocation.
To exemplify, Party A could engage in a conversationwith party
B about, for instance, passing party A’s child on an exam. In
response, party B would evaluate party A’s social standing and
relevance, as well as party A’s capability to reciprocate the favor in
the future (Fig. 3). In another scenario, a hospital directormay ask a
professor to pass the director’s son during an exam, and the
professor may do so with the awareness that he may need medical
care at some point in the future. Another recognizable trait of the
country’s higher education is that professors are often politicians
and politicians become professors. As the study has demonstrated,
favors are reciprocated amongst the equals.
The elites reinforce each other’s positions of power by creating
strongholds within key sectors. Education is one of them, and the
gatekeepers in academia are politicallywell entrenched. Professors
are typically not favoring students in fear of their parents’ social or
political inﬂuence, but out of desire to solidify their political power
and that of their afﬁliates that operate in other sectors. To
exemplify, Hamdija Lipovaca, a former Prime Minister of the Una-
Sana Canton, located in the northwestern Bosnia, has also served as
a faculty member at the University of Bihac’s Law School. Recent
riots in the Una-Sana Canton resulted in his forceful resignation
and later arrest on charges of corruption. Questions are continually
raised on the court’s ability to handle his case given his deeply
embedded relations to power holders across sectors. His wife, for
instance, works as a judge for the very court that is to handle his
case. Though poorly deﬁned yet deeply complex, favor exchanges
remain highly effective tools that, if endemic, tailor social mobility
models and power structures to the speciﬁcations of the societal
elites.
We further extend this conception by arguing that social-
equivalency-based exchanges do not involve bribes likely as the
parties are cognizant of the greater value associated with the favor
exchanges relative to a one-time bribe. In other words, in
educational settings, elites prefer the-favor-exchanges model
versus the-bribe model when interacting with the social equals
and potential value of the reciprocal favor is expected to exceed
that of a one-time payment. The immediacy of a bribe is preferred
when engaging in corruption with those of lesser social status.
Consequently, such interactions, particularly when widespread
and normatively acceptedwithin the communities involved, have a
direct and adverse impact on the upward social mobility models
within any educational context. With this espousal of non-merit-
based mobility in the society, coupled with the existing
fragmentations, divisions, and instabilities within fragile states
such as Bosnia, the chances of the country’s long-term develop-
ment, stability, and peace are meaningfully jeopardized.
5. Conclusion
If Bosnia is to emergewith success from its debilitating past, key
reforms are needed to investigate and eliminate corruption in its
entirety and in the education sector particularly. The role elites
play in allowing favor-based reciprocations to weaken education
equality for non-[143_TD$DIFF]elite students should be taken into consideration.
Pecuniary versus non-pecuniary forms of corruption is a salient
differentiation that should be further analyzed beyond Bosnian
context. In truth, the nuanced typology presented in this studymay
frustrate current notions of corruption because it does not
exchange material entities. The danger of favor reciprocation lies
in the facets which compose it: the intractability of the exchange,
and the control mechanisms that are in place to ensure that social
ambition continues to beget profound inequities in the one
institution that should ideally allow social mobility: education.
Moreover, favor reciprocation also severely undermines the trust
of the average citizen in public goods such as education and the
legal system, furtherweakening the people’s belief in a just society,
leading to fractures that may erupt in violence.
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